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The Dartmouth
May 7, 2024 | Latest Issue
The Dartmouth

The Godfather

My friend's father owns and operates The Colonial Funeral Home right outside New Haven, Connecticut. The business is known for its somewhat tasteless and offensive ads, but the company makes up for its edginess with credible service and honest prices. One day my friend's father and I were discussing why people are so susceptible to getting ripped off on funerals. "It's easy to sell someone a product when they're not in their normal state of mind," he told me over a cup of coffee and an open casket.

As dark an analogy as it is, the American public was sold Iraq because of the fear and hysteria caused by Sept. 11. I choose the word sold because what took place was a business transaction. Using advertising strategy and political jargon the Bush administration sold the war, and the American people -- foolish and deceived -- didn't even bother to bargain. The war was never personal (for those critics who view the conflict as a son attacking the villain who "tried to kill his daddy"), it was, as Michael Corleone puts it, "strictly business."

The first step to every transaction is to define the products. In terms of the Iraqi conflict this meant polarization. The only way to persuade the public into buying the war -- the product -- was to make it a necessity. Playing off American fears, terms such as "weapons of mass destruction," became nauseating fixtures of every media outlet and political debate. The problem was that weapons were never uncovered. So the Bush team polarized the conflict even further. The finding of weapons of mass destruction, once the clear and foremost objective of the intervention, was replaced with the removal of the evil, sadistic dictator. The public was reminded of the chemical bombing of northern Kurdish villages twelve years ago (never mind that such genocide has occurred in Hama and Rwanda). Former Iraqi citizens were brought on news talk shows to depict the horrors of living under Saddam. Finally, and most dishonestly, connections between Saddam and Al Qaeda were contrived. The product had been advertised, and with the sell on the verge of completion the Bush team worked on relieving transaction costs.

Transaction costs -- the costs accumulated through the conduct of the deal -- were the main concerns of the American public. But with calm reassurance Bush alleviated our worries by de-emphasizing the prospect of war. Casualty projections, cost projections, even time projections were not released. When members of the Congressional Budget Office hinted at a 200 billion dollar cost, the White House struck swiftly to deny the validity of the figures. Disillusioned, the public thought the war would be another Persian Gulf -- even better, another Afghanistan. The final touch was convincing the public that there were co-partners. The "Coalition of the Willing," although "growing everyday" is an obvious fabrication. A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of Eritrea, one of the coalition members, was forced to defend his country's neutrality with the statement: "We are not having any kind of involvement." Statements of neutrality have been issued by other nations, but coalition numbers -- for some unexplainable reason -- continue to grow.

Finally, the war was framed and doctored with the principles of marketing and image management. Peter Sealey, professor of marketing at the Haas School of Business at UC Berkeley, summarized it as such, "One sight, one sound, one sell -- classic brand management." Different brands were tried -- U.N. credibility, international security, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism -- and each one worked for a period of time. As it stands now, Bush and Co. have redefined a huge geopolitical conflict with social, political and economic undertones into the simple act of "freeing 23 million Iraqis." Spin doctoring and the addition of euphemisms are rhetorical themes. During a March nineteenth speech the President used the word "war" only once. This effective marketing strategy oversimplifies and under-emphasizes the war, making it more acceptable for the public's consumption. "Aggressive removal of the dictator" goes over better then "the killing of Saddam Hussein." "Shock and awe" is really a glorified phrase for bombing the hell out of Baghdad. Consequently, the administration has pushed the patriotic card to further its agenda on the domestic front, as the near passage of the 1984-like Patriot Act II demonstrates.

The war, sorry, "Operation Iraqi Freedom," was marketed, showcased, and sold to the American public, and almost solely the American public. Most foreign nations were presented the product and found it too risky. The costs: international image, money, future occupation, possibly the U.N, and most importantly British, Australian, American, Iranian, Iraqi and Kurdish lives, were shown but under the guise of duty, responsibility, and protection.

"The President's been successful in packaging and positioning the military effort," said Robert Passikoff, president of Brand Keys, a New York brand and customer loyalty research firm, "so that the messaging, the communication all resonates with real American values all wrapped in the flag." There was nothing personal about this war. It was strictly business. In the end the product was sold, and the man who sold it is looking at tenure.