Columnist Joe Peters '99 confessed recently that he will most likely not vote Nov. 5 because the "stakes are low, the candidates uninspiring, and the issues stale" ["Why Vote?", The Dartmouth, Oct. 14]. His attitude toward the Presidential election reflects a profoundly problematic and pervasive trend that all liberal democracies have been witnessing in their countries. Unless a conscious effort is made to reverse this trend, liberal democracies might be heading toward a disastrous end.
As I briefly discussed in my last column, ["Why Dole Should Win",The Dartmouth Oct. 14], liberal democracies have tamed the once innate human desire for recognition, which frequently in the past manifested itself as overwhelming impulses to overcome adversities through hostile means. Liberal democratic institutions have fundamentally transformed us into people who are satisfied simply by seeking economic welfare. Humans' rational capacity seems to have finally prevailed over their desire for recognition -- the most powerful element of human nature in the past, as Plato would agree.
The increasingly prominent role of rationality -- in particular, economic rationality -- in human behavior is the cause of the growing political apathy in liberal democracies. Two respected game theorists -- Dixit and Nalebuff -- explained this phenomenon in their celebrated "Thinking Strategically" and illustrated the implication of such rationality on political behavior.
Their analysis begins with the simple truth that the only time a citizen's vote would count is when his or her vote could break a tie. In all other circumstances the citizen is not able to influence the final outcome.
For example, take a look at a competition between two individuals running for a position in a student organization composed of five voters, including you. If, without your vote, two vote for one candidate, while the remaining two for the other, then your vote clearly matters. However, if the race, without your vote, is one to three, the closest outcome to a tie, you are unable to influence the election, because the winner is already decided without your vote.
In this case, since the size of the organization is relatively small, the chance of a tie is good -- 37.5 percent, to be exact. The voter has a strong incentive to participate in the election. However, as the size of the electorate grows, such a chance diminishes. Dixit and Nalebuff write that in a direct election with 100 million voters, the possibility of a tie is only one in 12,000.
Well aware of his or her insignificant role in elections, the rational voter would calculate the opportunity cost of his or her time spent on elections, and would likely see the forgone 20 minutes of paid time more valuable than such time spent on registration and voting. Rationality thus has a deleterious effect on the desire to vote.
Of course, such an individual might still be motivated to vote in a country where candidates in opposition are drastically different. But as liberal democracies converge into a "universal and homogeneous state," as envisioned by the great political philosopher Alexandre Kojeve, the diversity of opinions and beliefs is no longer ostensible. This convergence, exemplified by the indistinguishable Democratic and Republican platforms, has become the source of the voter's woes.
The solution, I believe, to this political boredom is the dissolution of the executive branch and the institution of a parliamentary system in which political powers are separated only between the legislative and judiciary branches. The executive branch is based on an outdated elitist belief -- first developed by Locke and later popularized by Madison -- that the legislative branch, representing the will of the masses, would naturally reflect their whimsical, and often self-destructive, nature. The belief rests on the premise that the executive branch, serving as constant political authority, would prevent such danger arising from the legislative branch.
The fact that the Americans have arrived at the middle of what once was a wide political spectrum shows that the potential risk caused by swings in political demands has declined tremendously. As a result, the executive branch serves no purpose except to add another layer of government inefficiency.
A parliamentary system, which would redirect people's attention to their representatives, would stimulate political participation, because the much larger number of candidates would underscore the diversity of opinions. This is clear when you see that America still votes into office racists like Jesse Helms on the right and socialists like Charles Rangel on the left.
However, a shift from a presidential system to a parliamentary one is a temporary solution, for if cultural homogenization continues, diversity in the Congressional race will eventually disappear. The only long-term answer is to socialize humans into political beings through education enforcing civic duties. The failure to do so will mean collapse of liberal democracy.
