Neuro-determinism is a scientific explanation of human behavior, which holds that the physical structure of the brain, and not free will, determines people's actions.
When applied to law, neuro-determinism leads people to believe in the so-called "disappearing person," one whose mental state -- sane or not -- has no bearing on legal responsibility.
While Morse said he believes in neuro-determinism, he challenged the disappearing person philosophy and argued that the law can recognize people as responsible for their actions, so long as they are capable of making rational decisions.
"If [people] weren't rational, even though they acted consciously and intentionally, then they would not be responsible," Morse said. "If you were reasonably rational when you committed the crime, I don't care what your brain looks like or what your childhood was like; you are responsible."
Existing conditions are no excuse for criminal behavior, Morse said.
Since the law is "folk-psychological," or dependant on social constructions and popular beliefs, people in a society establish a set of rules to avoid conflict. The individuals who cannot rationally understand or follow these rules are often legally exempt, Morse said.
"Think of the people we would now excuse of [litigation] -- children, the mentally ill," Morse said. "They all have rationality problems, meaning they have problems playing by the rules."
The application of neuroscience to the law, therefore, is not intended to dismiss practical reason but to explain it, Morse said. Relying too much on neurology to explain our actions can displace responsibility and cause people to forget that they are people, who act for a reason.
Morse cited researcher Benjamin Libet's work with neural activities as an opposing perspective on mental states. Libet's experiment discovered that brain activation occurs before subjects actually make a conscious choice. Morse interpreted these conclusions as incorrectly placing emphasis on the physical brain's role in determining action.
"A readiness potential is not a decision," Morse said. "Brains don't decide things. People decide things."
While advances in neuroscience have the potential to help legal systems judge whether or not people are rational, neurological impulses do not drive people to commit crimes, according to Morse. Instead, people maintain a degree of free will, he said.
"We are not Pinocchios," Morse said. "Our neurons are not pulling the strings."
There are three occasions when a person is not legally responsible for his own actions, Morse said, including when a person is considered insane, commits crimes in self-defense or when another person is obviously liable for a person's actions, Morse said.
Morse is currently writing a book, "Desert and Disease: Responsibility and Social Control," about the neuroscientific impact on the criminal justice system.
The event was a part of the annual William H. Timbers '37 lecture, co-sponsored by the Dartmouth Legal Studies Faculty and the Dartmouth Lawyers Association.
