Since the United States and Israel launched a series of aerial attacks on Iran on Feb. 28, the conflict has expanded to Lebanon and other countries in the Middle East and impacted the global economy. The initial strikes resulted in the death of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and prompted retaliatory strikes across the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, spiking global oil prices. As of March 30, at least 13 American service members have also been killed.
The Dartmouth sat down with five professors on March 6 to discuss the Iran War up to that point. More than three weeks later, as the conflict rapidly develops, The Dartmouth sat down with visiting government and Jewish studies professor Steven Simon, whose book “Grand Delusion” examines American intervention in the Middle East since the Reagan Administration, to discuss recent events, including President Donald Trump’s threat to attack Iranian infrastructure on Monday. Simon, who currently serves as a distinguished visiting fellow at the Davidson Institute for Global Security, has worked for the U.S. State Departments during the Clinton and Obama administrations and co-authored eight books on the Middle East.
In “Grand Delusion,” you argue that U.S. ambitions in the Middle East have consistently exceeded what policy tools can realistically achieve. Do you view the current war with Iran as a continuation of that pattern?
SS: It certainly seems to fit the pattern. The odd thing about this war is that the U.S. began the campaign with where the plan usually ends — with attacks against the leadership in Iran. Because they inverted the usual plan, the administration now faces a dilemma as to how to escalate.
The administration is now talking about the deployment of ground troops and infrastructure attacks of a very broad nature that would constitute war crimes under international law. You cannot target desalination plants or sewage treatment plans because the harm will befall civilians. The U.S. administration either has to escalate fairly sharply, or they need to declare victory and say they have got some kind of agreement with the Iranians. But the administration is not prepared to do that yet. And the Iranians understand that they have the U.S. administration hoisted on its own guitar. They’re not gonna play into any U.S. attempt to wind down the conflict. It’s a tough position right now for both Tehran and Washington, and it comes down to the question of which side can endure more pain longer.
What outcomes do the Iranian regime, President Donald Trump and people of both nations want?
SS: Judging by the survey returns, it looks as though the war is not working to the president’s political advantage, even though the vast majority of Republican voters remain supportive of the war effort and its objectives. How broader public opinion will play into midterm election results and affect the prospects of Republicans frontrunners for the presidential nomination in 2028 is an open question, but it’s pretty clear that the Republican Party is a bit worried about that. The president’s chief of staff Susie Wiles signaled gas prices are politically costly.
For the Iranians, I don’t see that they have much choice but to play the hand that they have, which is to continue drawing U.S. allies’ blood and keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed to maintain economic pressure on the West and the U.S. administration because they understand that Trump is vulnerable on that score.
Do you think regime change is still possible without a full-scale ground invasion?
SS: It doesn’t look that way. The U.S. and Israel wiped out a major part of the Iranian political elite and hit most of its key players. The Iranian regime has already absorbed a tremendous blow, but it still keeps ticking. There haven’t been any major protests in the streets. The regime has a widely distributed layered and redundant security establishment throughout the country that has the guns and that can keep order. I don’t really see the prospect of regime change, at least in the foreseeable future.
What are the most important lessons the U.S. has learned from its interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq and other conflicts in the region? How do you think the U.S. can apply those going forward?
SS: I don’t think any lessons have been learned. Every administration is different, with its own temperance, character, nature of leadership and decision-making processes. This war seems very improvised. It’s hard to say whether it’s based on any knowledge or lessons learned.
Historians won’t know for a while how the decision to wage the war was made, but it doesn’t appear to have been made with a lot of forethought. There was no forcing event for the war. It may be as simple as Iran looked weak and the U.S. felt strong. It had a parasol ally in the form of Israel, and they just figured, “Hey, this was gonna be a cakewalk.” That is, going back to my book, a grand delusion. This isn’t the first time, or the last time, that the U.S. indulged in it.
This article has been edited for clarity and length.
Jackson Hyde ’28 is a senior news reporter, who writes about artificial intelligence and technology at the College. He is from Los Angeles, Calif., and is majoring in Government modified with Philosophy.
