In the past 10 days, under the world's close watch, the U.N. Security Council closed rank by unanimously passing a strong new resolution to disarm Iraq. In a letter delivered two days before the U.N. deadline, Iraq tepidly agreed to allow the inspections. Had Iraq overtly opposed the new rules for inspection, then the United States and the United Nations could claim justification for an invasion to at least disarm, and, more likely, to remove Saddam. Saddam, in his insidious passive aggression, defended his decision to allow inspectors by saying that he wanted to frustrate American war-mongers by forcing them to play the U.N. inspections game.
With inspectors set to arrive in Iraq today, Saddam's remarks to his Parliament raise important questions. Is the U.N. resolution the consequence of an international game created to delay or corral an American invasion, or is it a genuine attempt to contain Iraqi aggression?
The Security Council's vote and Iraq's acceptance of inspections force the United States to more clearly define its criteria and goals of war with Iraq. If the United States' real interests in Iraq are simply to ensure that Iraq will not have a nuclear arsenal to use against the United States or any other nation, then inspections, depending on how well they go, should suffice. But if the Bush administration's aspirations are driven by an insistence on regime change to protect the Iraqi people, or by the desire to assert U.S. power to send a message to tyrants of the world or, equally likely, to avenge George Senior's inability to truly neutralize Saddam, then inspections, no matter the outcome, will not quell the U.S.-Iraq conflict.
The head of the inspections, Hans Blix, said that he is leading his team in with no preconceived opinions. On Friday, he said in a press conference that "we are not contending that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction." Blix doesn't want to be manipulated the same way that previous inspectors were, and his cautious optimism is one way to approach inspections. After all, a team who already believes that Iraq is guilty is a team that is headed for failure. On the other hand, a team relying only on Iraq's word is a team that may find itself naively mirroring previous inspectors.
We, too, are faced with a dilemma: we need to approach inspections with the good ol' American optimism that a genuine attempt at diplomatic policy deserves, while still not allowing ourselves to be deceived again by a regime we know to be two-faced. We need to strike a balance between hoping for the best and preparing for the worst.
If we think about inspections only as an ineffectual process to which we must appear to submit while waiting for our moment to strike, then the inspections cannot possibly be effective, even if Iraq submits to all U.N. deadlines and policies. It would seem prudent to give the inspections a genuine chance to disarm Iraq before we leap headlong into war. Inspections should actually be the first intent of U.S. policy and not a pretext.
In the same way that the presence of the United Nations and international opinion has shaped U.S. policy in dealing with Iraq, the same dynamics could contain Saddam -- assuming, of course, that he is at all rational and cares about the preservation of his regime. The existence of a strong confederation of civilized nations could create an international defense policy which could contain, if not eliminate, rogue leaders. Instead of relying on military invasions, we could develop sufficient diplomatic coercion to accomplish our dreams of permanent disarmament.
The success of diplomatic coercion would be the ultimate irony in the ongoing U.S.-Iraq conflict. What if our war-extolling president werethe unwitting father of a new global defense policy that favors diplomatic manipulation over pre-emptive military invasions, much in the same way that Reagan was the president who watched the fall of the Berlin Wall through diplomacy?
U.N. inspections may ultimately be unsuccessful, but they will not be pointless. The way that the United States approaches the inspections will influence the next phase of our relationship with Iraq and the international community. Most important, if we eventually invade, we're going to need the help of the United Nations, particularly in the aftermath. Inspections, disregarding the lofty goals of altering global defense strategy, will keep the support of the United Nations, and that is support that America needs.
Like it or not, and as difficult to deal with it as it is, the United Nations is our best vehicle for resolution of international disputes. Working with U.N. procedures and demonstrating respect rather than contempt for the United Nations provides an internal check for U.S. policy because it forces us to reflect about our own motivations before committing American lives and vast resources. Cooperation with the international community, unless impossible in a dire and perilous moment, gives our actions an air of legitimacy we wouldn't otherwise have.
