I am currently working in Washington D.C. for a lobby to reduce weapons of mass destruction. Although I agree with proponents of a national missile defense in their intent to create a more peaceful deterrence strategy, I am bothered by their alarmist approach to this issue, and their insistence upon deploying the system, even if it could create another arms race and force America to unilaterally withdraw from treaties. Opponents of a rushed deployment of missile defense worry about funds being siphoned from domestic programs to support defense (Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin has indicated that by 2003 the defense budget will most likely cut into the Medicare trust fund), but we also harbor many deeper concerns.
I agree wholeheartedly with NMD proponents' dislike of the policy of mutually assured destruction (aptly termed as "MAD") -- the guarantee that if America's mainland were threatened by nuclear attack from Russia, we could, in retaliation, significantly destroy Russia's citizens and infrastructure. Mutual assured destruction is an unfortunate relic of the Cold War, but at the time was a necessary means of deterrence. A national missile defense would be an effective alternative, but it will take years to develop. If Bush were presenting Russia with a concrete number of significant nuclear weapons cuts (below START II levels) that we are willing to agree to, an American missile defense system would not be threatening to Russia. But Bush does not have the backing of the Pentagon for the cuts, and is therefore only offering vague suggestions of proliferation reductions and asserting that America is determined to move ahead quickly with missile defense. This leads Russia to fear that we will have a first-strike capability with the added advantage of a shield to block retaliation.
Those of us who argue against Bush's strategy agree that missile defense, developed on a multilateral basis, would be much preferable to MAD. However, the reality of missile defense is that it is going to take years to test, let alone to deploy. Many NMD fans have cited the July 14 ExoAtmospheric Kill Vehicle test as one that proves the technical feasibility of missile defense. Although this test did prove that we are able to "hit a bullet with a bullet," it was only the fourth of at least 100 that will need to be performed in order to make missile defense work, according to Philip Coyle, former director of Operational Test and Evaluation. A very significant factor of the July 14th simulation is that the target warhead contained a C-band transponder, which a Pentagon official confirmed, had target location data that "gave the interceptor rocket [the mechanism designed to shoot down the simulation enemy target warhead] a precise point in space at which to aim and made its job much easier." The missile defense program's technical director, Keith Englander, confirmed that the transponder was used. Also, a decoy used in the test, meant to "trick" the interceptor, did not have a homing beacon. Essentially, the supposed "enemy warhead" aimed at the United States contained a radar message telling the interceptor, "I'm here. These are the coordinates you will need to aim at in order to hit me."
Why should we attempt to hurriedly deploy a system that, as of now, requires a nametag and specific coordinates from the enemy in order to shoot down a missile? We do not need to rush deployment -- that is years away, and the time it will take us to test NMD allows for cooperative, multilateral agreements about missile defense that could prevent the possibility of an arms race. As we move along with a more reasonable schedule of missile defense testing, we should also be attempting to negotiate with nations such as Iraq and North Korea to prevent them from producing ICBMs and reducing our own stockpiles at a reasonable rate.
I believe there are few people who would claim that the ABM treaty and other non-proliferation agreements were not vital to ending the terror of nuclear destruction inspired by the Cold War. The Bush administration itself has said that certain treaties are extremely important to maintaining U.S. and global security, including the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and nonproliferation policy. Yes, treaties must be revised and amended to fit new paradigms. But that does not mean that they must be torn up, or assessed as unimportant.
Missile defense, although praised by its proponents every time one small, simplified test is deemed "successful," will never be the perfect, plexiglass shield that it is made out to be. I hope that our government will embark upon this scientific project as it does any other -- in a methodical, rational manner, one that will not negatively deplete the resources of other necessary domestic and military programs and one that will not unilaterally abrogate treaties.