While the United States can safely move to reduce the size of its nuclear arsenal a possibility currently being explored by the Obama administration it must retain its smallest, most accurate warheads, according to an Oct. 22 paper in Foreign Affairs by Dartmouth government professor Daryl Press. These weapons will act as a credible deterrent against nuclear escalation during a conventional war with a nuclear-armed adversary, Press argues in the paper.
"These are the weapons, which, in terrible circumstances, would give the U.S. president an acceptable retaliatory capability and would provide credible deterrence," Press, the coordinator of the War and Peace Studies Program at the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, said in an interview with The Dartmouth.
In the paper, "The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent," Press and co-author Keir Lieber, a professor in the security studies program at Georgetown University, argue that nuclear deterrence will become increasingly difficult over the course of the 21st century.
As many of the United State's potential adversaries, including China and North Korea, have acquired or are attempting to acquire nuclear weapons, the United States will eventually face a nuclear-armed opponent in conventional warfare and must maintain a nuclear arsenal to reduce the risk of escalation, Press and Lieber wrote.
The White House is currently reviewing U.S. nuclear strategy, and will likely reduce the size of the country's arsenal. The United States' nuclear force includes approximately 2,200 operational warheads.
"[Lieber] and I agree with Obama's position, but we argue that it matters a great deal which weapons we keep," Press said.
Using computer simulations, the researchers determined that a nuclear strike to destroy potential adversaries' nuclear forces is possible using low-yield weapons and would result in fewer than 700 civilian casualties, Press said. Similar simulations using high-yield weapons predicted approximately 3 million civilian casualties, Press said.
"Before our study, the conventional wisdom was that the United States could use its nukes during a terrible war and destroy enemy nuclear forces, but that the civilian casualties would be calamitous," Press said.
High-yield weapons are not as effective as a deterrent, Press said, because potential adversaries recognize that the United States would hesitate to cause so many civilian deaths.
Columbia University international affairs professor Robert Jervis said in an interview that he generally agreed with Press and Liber's findings, but felt the authors may have overestimated the aggressiveness of potential adversaries.
"They're right if you think some very, very unlikely scenarios are likely to arise," Jervis said.
Jervis said that the United States' move to refine its arsenal could cause potential adversaries to do the same.
"You do teach countries bad lessons that we don't want them to learn," Jervis said.
He noted that the authors address his objection in their paper, arguing that the added deterrence gained from refining the U.S. forces outweighs these disadvantages.
"It really is a very useful article because many people in this area haven't thought this many steps ahead," Jervis said.
Press said that the paper was inspired in part by his experience teaching a class on nuclear weapons at the College.
"Teaching that class and answering questions from the undergraduates forced me to go back and question the truths' about nuclear deterrence," he said.
Press said he will include the article in one of his upcoming books, which will be a compilation of the articles he and Lieber have written about nuclear weapons policy.
