For once, George W. Bush is right. Iran has the resources and expertise to build a nuke, and if they construct one, as many experts agree they will soon do, this Shi'ite country could possibly threaten the balance of power in the Middle East, i.e., U.S. hegemony. Yet the worst case scenario is the formation of a multilateral balance of power between the U.S., Israel, and Iran, which is not so bad considering that for the past half century, America has sought nothing less than a balance of power throughout the world. The only difference now is the player lineup.
In the Iranian nuclear crisis, the best the U.S. can hope for is containment of Iran's nuclear materials, equipment, and expertise. After all, the threat is not Iran getting a nuke but other countries or groups acquiring one, since Iran, being a country with a physical demarcation, has an automatic return address for any attack it perpetrates on U.S. forces or allies, while terrorists, as American excursions in the mountains of Afghanistan have shown, are much more evasive. Thus, the Bush administration should focus less on preventing Iran from acquiring nukes and more on preventing Iran from becoming the next A.Q. Khan of weapons and expertise proliferation.
U.S. officials may be able to negotiate for better information about Iran's nuclear capabilities if they eschew invasion or bombing plans, none of which have any practical applications, and drop the threat of force in the event of the discovery of Iranian nuclear weapons. The Bush administration must give up its hard line position and simply let Iran do what they want within the confines of their facilities, as long as they do not share sensitive technology, materials, or expertise with any other nation or sub-national group. As American intelligence cannot see what takes place inside the seventy-plus Iranian nuclear facilities, the Bush administration cannot know Iran's exact progress. The shear number of facilities also makes a surgical strike all but impossible.
America, of course, cannot support Iran's recognition as a nuclear power under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was created to prevent non-nuclear weapon countries like Iran from attaining such devices. However, the Bush Administration can allow Iran to decide the face it shows to the world, as the U.S. has allowed Israel to maintain its ambiguous nuclear reputation despite strong evidence of its nuclear arsenal.To many Americans, such a policy towards Iran would seem a dangerous gamble, but since Iran has shown little interest even for European offers of economic and technical aid, it appears that the only solution to this crisis that Iran will ever accept is acquisition of one or more nuclear weapons. The positive consequences from Iran joining, officially or ambiguously, the nuclear club, rarely come up in press conferences with top Bush officials, but such benefits are possible. For example, as Iran is surrounded on all sides by nations that the U.S. either occupies, has ground or air forces in, or has security agreements with, Iran has a substantial incentive to use every resource it has, even nukes, to deter any potential attackers, i.e., Bush's axis of freedom. Therefore, a nuclear Iran may help stabilize the Middle East.
Some hardliners believe such a situation would lead other neighboring states, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Lebanon, to develop nuclear weapons of their own. However, Saudi Arabia's deeply rooted economic ties with the U.S., vis--vis black gold, will impede any impulsive desire for nukes, and Syria has neither the infrastructure nor the scientific expertise to tackle such a risky venture. Lebanon, in its recent political turmoil, will be about as likely to pursue such weapons as Jordan, especially due to the rising grass-roots activism of European-minded Lebanese. It seems that neither Hezbollah-backed nor anti-Syrian activists want internal turmoil, which debate over a nuclear program could very well precipitate.
It is also possible that Iran may serve as a guard for other nations in the Middle East against Israel, giving security guarantees to friendly nations as the U.S. did with Western Europe during the Cold War.
Though such military ties could make Iran a potential contender in the region, such an opposition to Israel may be necessary in order to force Israel to complete its withdrawal from the Gaza strip and commence negotiations for the permanent establishment of a Palestinian state.
With a nuclear power each to support Israel and Palestine, the Palestinians will feel more confident in asserting themselves, and the Israelis will have a strong incentive to resolve the conflict peacefully, as the U.S. will not likely allow itself to be dragged into a conventional or nuclear war with Iran.
The accelerated progress of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and a relative balance of power in the Middle East between Israel and Iran could also undermine terrorist recruiters, as potential suicide bombers would likely feel less threatened by U.S. forces in the region and would have less to gripe about in reference to Israel. This is not to say that a nuclear Iran will necessarily cripple terrorist recruiting, as the substantial U.S. military presence in the Middle East will continue to be a rallying point for extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic Jihad. However, a nuclear counter to Israel in the region creates the possibility of a regional balance of power in which the threat of mutually-assured destruction, as in the Cold War, prevents major conflicts from occurring.
