Amidst the current national debate over the proper United States policy toward Iraq, the pro-invasion argument is based almost exclusively on Iraq's putative weapons of mass destruction programs and the Iraqi government's ties to terrorist organizations.
The claim that Iraq is carrying out a renewed weapons program, whether or not it's true, does not provide a new or unique reason for invasion. That suspicion has existed for nearly four years now, dating back to when Iraq first kicked out the United Nations Special Commission weapons inspectors in 1999. As for the links to al Qaeda, the evidence presented so far are much less than conclusive, and are nowhere close to approaching the kind of case that the United States was able to make against Afghanistan and the Taliban. Critics of an invasion cite these two arguments as the premises leading to their opposition.
However, the two given above are not exhaustive of legitimate reasons to go to war against Iraq. The United States does indeed have a good case based on security concerns for advocating a regime change in Iraq. Were the United States to commit to rebuilding Iraq after Saddam's removal and to withdraw all U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and neighboring Gulf states, a move against Saddam may very well be an opportunity for the United States to kill two birds with one stone.
From what we know based on their previous actions and stated goals, al Qaeda's first and foremost objective in its attacks on the United States is to force the U.S. to remove its forces from Saudi Arabia. Unlike American military forces in Europe and Korea, which have been there for over half a century, the presence in Saudi Arabia was a direct result of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Also, unlike its presence in Europe and Asia, America has neither an integrated defense plan with Saudi Arabia (like NATO), nor has it been traditionally and explicitly responsible for its defense (like it has with Japan). It is the threat of Iraq that brought U.S. forces to the region, and it is the threat of Iraq that keeps them there. Were the United States to defeat, occupy and reform Iraq, the forces in Saudi Arabia would lose their extant purpose.
Such a development would present the U.S. with a self-interested and face-saving reason to withdraw from Saudi Arabia. The self-interest is that terrorist groups like al Qaeda will have lost their major rallying point against the United States, and the face saving is that the U.S. will have withdrawn on its own terms, not to give in to terrorists.
But why should things be different just because the U.S. military moved down the street from Riyadh to Baghdad? I think there are significant differences between both the two countries, and the two types of U.S. presence.
First, al Qaeda may very simply stop working actively against the United States once the military leaves Saudi Arabia (they may cross paths on other issues, but this is the biggest). Iraq has not experienced in the past the kind of violence unleashed by religious extremists against the government, as have countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the latter of which has combated the terrorism of Islamic Jihad (which has merged with al Qaeda) for decades.
More importantly, while religious extremists from all around the world may be willing to support what they believe is the liberation of a land that is sacred, few would be willing to do the same for a land that has at most past political significance. The Crusaders repeatedly fought for Christian Jerusalem against the Muslims, but never for Christian Moscow against the pagan Mongols. Without the credibility of its cause, even if al Qaeda wanted to continue attacking the U.S., it would find fewer sources of support and sympathy.
Third, the U.S. presence in a post-Saddam Iraq, assuming we do a good job, will be substantially different from its current presence in Saudi Arabia. In the latter instance, the U.S. is propping up a repressive regime that is bent on maintaining an airtight society and channeling its own people's frustrations against outsiders: most ironically at its own protectors. To Saudis, be they religious extremists or just run-of-the-mill disgruntled subjects, the U.S. represents the greatest impediment to change in their government and society. It seems unlikely that the United States will be willing or able to convince the Saudi government to reform significantly, but that opportunity would exist in Iraq, assuming the U.S. commits to building its post-war political institutions.
The United States should strive to build a government in Iraq that is not repressive of religious activists, even if they do advocate theocratic laws and policies, and that is representative of all the factions in Iraq. The final form of the Iraqi government must be a decision made by its own people. Propping up repressive regimes that were anti-Communist in Latin America proved to have grave moral and diplomatic consequences for the U.S. then; propping up similar regimes in the Middle East that are anti-Islamist proved to have grave physical consequences now.
A free Iraq is the first, and necessary, step towards a free Middle East and ultimately a secure homeland in the Americas. As long as Saddam Hussein is in power, countries like Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait can continue to use the threat of Iraq as an excuse to stave off reforms in their own governments. Only when Saddam Hussein is deposed can the United States step aside and expose the current conflict with extremists for what is really is, not a clash of civilizations, but the manifestation of a struggle within the Islamic world.
