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The Dartmouth
April 29, 2024 | Latest Issue
The Dartmouth

Nuclear Politics

The Dartmouth's October 5 article, "Students plan for 2000 New Year's," suggested that many Dartmouth students are opting out of a big gala affair for new year's eve, and instead are planning a celebration on a smaller scale. Although not necessarily the most exciting way to spend New Year's Eve, hanging out in a basement this December, may be the wisest choice of all.

According to a new government report out last week, the chances of Americans being killed by a weapon of mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical or biological) are now greater than ever. The first of the three reports on national security, issued by the Secretary of Defense's Commission of National Security/21st Century, states that over the course of the next 25 years, "America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us." The report also added "Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers," as a result of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given the report's conclusions, we need to start thinking seriously about ways to protect ourselves from such weapons. Certainly the best way to prevent an attack from a weapon of mass destruction, is to prevent those weapons from being created in the first place.

Nothing currently up for debate is more effective in preventing the continued development of nuclear weapons than the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The CTBT was signed by over 150 countries in 1996 in order to accomplish one thing: bring an end to nuclear testing. In doing so, many of the world's nuclear powers and potential nuclear powers' weapons development programs will be slowed, if not frozen at their current levels. And since the U.S. already has a tremendous technological lead, we would maintain our advantage indefinitely. In order to enforce the ban on testing, the treaty would allow the U.S. and others to closely monitor the nuclear capabilities of every other potential nuclear power in the world through monitoring stations and on-site inspections. These monitoring techniques would be extremely useful in an era when our own intelligence agencies are less capable of detecting low-level nuclear testing.

Despite these benefits, the treaty has only been ratified by 26 countries in the three years since it was signed. Furthermore, our own Senate has ignored the treaty, even though it could potentially lead to much greater security for the U.S. For these reasons, it is particularly odd that in the middle of tense budget negotiations, the Senate has finally scheduled a vote on the treaty for October 12. Despite lengthy testimony from Defense Secretary William Cohen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Hugh Shelton, and other military experts in favor of the treaty, several Senators indicated that they had serious reservations about voting for it. One important point raised is whether the Stockpile Stewardship Program, the system of testing and upgrading our nuclear weapons (that does not use nuclear testing), is reliable enough to maintain our current level of nuclear defense indefinitely. Nuclear missiles, like any other weapons, decay over time.

The question is whether the treaty would prevent the U.S. from building newer weapons, should the need arise. Up until now, our ability to make viable threats of retaliation has been the most effective force in deterring terrorists and rogue nations from using weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, scientists say the question cannot be answered for sure, until 2005.

Another question, raised by Senator Helms, is whether the recent espionage by China allowed that country so much access to sensitive information that they are capable of updating their weapons systems without the use of nuclear testing. If China has actually stolen enough information to upgrade their nuclear weapons to the same level as ours, we are going to have to resume nuclear testing in order to make major improvements in our nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if China has not stolen the information necessary to upgrade their missiles, we should do everything we can to prevent the country from making improvements on their own. Since we have only just begun to assess the damage of the Chinese espionage, it is impossible to say what level of information they obtained. Given the magnitude of this decision and our ignorance as to the effectiveness of the Stewardship Program and the extent of the espionage, the best solution would be to delay the Senate's vote.

To use a cliche, this is neither the time nor the place to decide something of such vast importance. If the treaty is voted down in the Senate next week, there could be some very disturbing ramifications. To begin with, it will effectively stop any other country from signing the treaty. A crucial part of the treaty states that if any one of the 44 countries with nuclear technology fails to ratify the treaty, it will not go into effect. Another more frightening possibility is that nuclear testing will continue in countries like India, Pakistan, China, North Korea and France.

Aside from the environmental destruction, more nuclear tests will almost certainly lead to greater nuclear proliferation among those nations and any others they may decide to sell nuclear weapons to. With more nuclear weapons in the world, there is a greater risk of intentional or unintentional disasters. Without the treaty's monitoring tools, the U.S. will need to seriously consider resuming its own nuclear testing in order to maintain our technological superiority over these other countries. In addition, we may have to also resume building new weapons to insure the security of our nation; in effect starting a new nuclear arms race, but on a much larger scale.

The potential effects of a decision on the treaty are so serious and far-reaching, that any rational person should see the need to wait at least six months in order to make a calm and fully educated choice regarding the treaty. To turn the future of our national defense into an issue of partisan squabbling, is a grave mistake and one that could have damaging effects on generations to come.