Why do we have Dartmouth "Secure"? Why not just have a really fast public Internet connection that everyone can use? Presumably, we have a guarded network so we can protect users' sensitive information. Kiewit, which is responsible for the maintenance of Dartmouth's main computer networks, has seen an overhaul of these systems in the last year. Before the new Internet security policies were implemented, Dartmouth had a reasonably strong network, but our networks are now laughably insecure. Despite knowledgeable individuals bringing this fact to Kiewit's attention, these problems have been ignored and Kiewit refuses to rectify them. This raises serious questions not only about our network security, but the ways in which the Dartmouth administration operates.
The old Internet security policies operated on a mutual certificate system where both the Dartmouth servers and each machine had its own, authenticated certificate. Whenever a laptop or phone would attempt to connect to the secure network, the matching pairs of certificates between client and server would perform a "handshake," giving users access to the network. Certainly, at times this old method seemed like an inconvenience I had to get four certificates for my three laptops and smartphone. Now, I just download a neat program, install it and, after several seconds of magic, I gain access to the wonderful tubes on which the Internet runs! But trading security for convenience is not an acceptable policy when it comes to the safety and privacy of our community.
So why was the old certificate system better? The most important reason is that the user's password was not stored on an individual computer's hard drive, nor was it transmitted over the network. Instead, the password was solely used in authenticating a certificate and, once that single transaction had taken place, only the certificates themselves were ever used to gain access. From an educational standpoint, we trained our community to be very skeptical of ever entering passwords on the Internet where they can be susceptible to a whole host of attacks. The entire principle rested on the fact that users' passwords were barely needed and never asked. So if an authenticated laptop was stolen, the owner could easily deactivate the certificate and the Dartmouth server would no longer recognize these certificates. Moreover, if a hacker intercepted a network communication, he would not have found any users' passwords because only certificates are transmitted.
With the current system, this is no longer the case. Not only does each and every one of our laptops now carry our respective passwords, they are also used on client-side verification, which means that Dartmouth Secure is now very insecure. There are cloud services that, for as little as $50, can retrieve a user's password from a "sniffed" network session; we are all now vulnerable to having our passwords stolen by hackers. Imagine if Dartmouth had already switched over to the new security policies before last February, when a custodian and his accomplice are accused of having stolen 22 laptops from the library ("Hanover Police arrest two for thefts," Mar. 26, 2012). They could have done a lot more harm than just ordinary theft since the computers' hard drives would have stored the users' passwords.
There is another way in which the new Kiewit system jeopardizes our security. Rather than using our own trust validation system via certificates, we now delegate responsibility for maintaining the security of our network to an external "digital notar." This new system trusts anyone who has his or her identity verified by it. Unfortunately, digital notar certificates can be acquired with minimal validation and can also be bought. Having our own, trusted certification authority is the only way to prevent rogue network point attacks. In fact, hacking into the Dartmouth network is even easier than weaseling one's way past a digital notar. In order to get someone's password, you just have to become Facebook friends with that person. Yes, it is really that simple. In order to reset someone else's password without their consent, you only need to find out their Network Identification and then answer the most basic questions that any one of hundreds of Facebook friends could answer: What is my high school's mascot? What is my mother's name? What was my middle school? Even worse, Dartmouth even provides the "Lookup NetID" link on the same webpage. We have reached an all-time low point where any remotely competent high school student can, without any difficulty, gain access to Dartmouth's networks.
Finally, Kiewit's new password guidelines also make discovering passwords much easier. The new password rules allow a maximum of only eight characters, which means that a hacker with a series of graphics processing units and field-programmable gate array processors can figure out your password in just 33 minutes. Furthermore, Kiewit's new, stringent guidelines limit many special characters and specifically recommend choosing two four-letter words and simply replacing one of the letters with a special character, such as fourw@lk. This "recommendation" would allow for even fewer possible passwords, making the lives of hackers that much easier.
Given how bad the new system is, the real question we should be asking is why we bother having authentication at all. Does it not seem like a waste having separate secure and public networks? Since any smart Hanover High School student can gain access to our systems, why not just raise the white flag? Throughout the entire process, Kiewit has simply ignored the advice and recommendations of individuals who point out these problems. Given the severity of the flaws, we need to seriously rethink not only our security policies but also in whom we place our trust. Between Kiewit's refusal to address the problem and the administration's apathy when it comes to educating the community regarding Internet security, Dartmouth is left vulnerable.
