The image in Saturday's New York Times is simple: on the left is President Berdymuhammedov of Turkmenistan, the greatest producer of oil in the former Soviet bloc second only to Russia; on the right, President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. The two men are enthusiastically shaking hands. In the middle stands a stoic but self-satisfied President Putin of Russia about to cover the handshake with the blessing of his own (governing) right hand.
The meaning of the image proves equally simple: The three men are celebrating a landmark agreement to "build a pipeline along the Caspian Sea coast to ship Turkmen natural gas to Western markets via Kazakhstan and Russia," a move the Times deems an unequivocal "blow to U.S. and European efforts to secure alternatives to Middle East oil and gas that would be independent from Russian influence."
In Sunday's New York Times, Ilan Greenberg explains things even more starkly: "President Putin['s brokered agreement]...deliver[ed] a major setback to continuing American efforts to send Central Asian natural gas exports directly to Europe." Monday's New York Times headline gets the most explicit: "U.S. Says Caspian Pipeline Deal "Not Good" for Europe," according to U.S. and EU officials.
And here I thought Russia was an ally....
I was wrong. But so too are those who consider Putin an enemy. To understand Russia, one needs to look less into the eyes and soul of its increasingly anti-democratic leader and more into his policies.
Russia has always been a major power since the days of the czars. Sure, after the Soviet bloc fell, Russia was in rubble, but it's back and the bear can be heard rumbling. Putin knows it; he understands the power of the oil pipelines that he wields as if they were whips to bring ex-Soviet nations back into line. For instance, when Ukraine seemed to lean pro-Western in Spring of 2006 -- which Putin interpreted as anti-Russian, for Putin believes in a preternatural clash of powers (he is an ex-KGB agent, after all) -- he threatened to shut off their oil pipeline. He backed down only after immense international pressure from the US and Europe.
But notice that none of the pressure comes from within. How could it? He has banished 'unfriendly' NGOs, nationalized private industries (i.e., Gazprom), imprisoned political opposition and all but banned non-State controlled media.
And yet the people of Russia love him. Why? Because the Russians have known nothing but strongmen--and in their absence, only a weak nation. They had a fledgling democracy under Yeltsin and they were inspired--but it didn't deliver goods and services.
The Russian people love Putin for making Russia strong again. And for Putin and the Russian people, that means wielding influence around central Asia, influence that the United States would prefer to exert itself. Thus: the struggle. The Sunday New York Times article provides a good example: "In a visit to Kazakhstan last summer, Vice President Dick Cheney lobbied for new energy routes that bypass Russia, calling Russia's wielding of its energy supplies 'tools for intimidation or blackmail.'" Putin has made his own accusations as well; most recently, he indirectly compared the Bush Administration to the Third Reich.
So the question remains: How do we deal with an independent and bellicose Russia?
First off, we stop reading Putin's soul through his eyes and recognize the man for who he is: Putin is Bismark; he is Disraeli; he is Kissinger--in short, he is a man of pure Russian realpolitik: He does that which is in the best interest of his nation at any given time, and he believes that the acquisition of power is the state's active purpose. And to give the man his due, he is doing a great job of it.
He is not a partner in the global fight for democracy. He is not an ideologue at all. He barely aids the War on Terror. It seems the only reason he "signed on" to that war was because it gave him further license to do as he liked with his own Muslim Chechen insurgents.
And therein lies the contours of an answer: align our interests. Convince Putin and Russia that we are not at odds, but rather on the same team. There is one thing that we both want more than anything else, and that is stability. If we can sell them on stability, then perhaps we needn't fight over every little influence-peddling squabble.
Meeting the many current challenges will be much easier through US-Russian collaboration. Our objective must be to convince Russia of that simple fact.
But that's just being realpolitik.
