"If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference to the devil in the House of Commons," admitted British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during World War II, exemplifying the sometimes necessary triumph of realism over idealism in foreign policy. Despite Stalin's organized mass murders throughout the 1930s, the democratic United States and United Kingdom forged an alliance with the authoritarian Soviet Union to defeat Nazi Germany. The United States conceded its ideals as the mastermind of the Soviet "gulag archipelago" became the seemingly amiable ally "Uncle Joe" Stalin.
Sixty years after World War II, the United States must reject making similar strategic commitments to regimes in the Middle East that contradict American ideals. Unlike the past century, the future barometer for foreign policy success will not be in territory captured, but in hearts and minds won. To ebb the tide of anti-Americanism in the 21st century, idealism, not realism, must ultimately carry the day in American foreign policy.
Average Arabs do not resent the West for the proliferation of American consumerism and corporations into their cultures. As Middle Eastern commentator Fareed Zakaria explains, "The politics of rage is local." The manner in which foreign policies directly impact individuals' daily lives, not the epic "clash of civilizations," is the greatest influence on their political temper. Over the past 50 years, Middle Easterners have despised the United States for propping up authoritarian regimes that protect America's regional interests, yet simultaneously deny their citizens fundamental rights.
In his State of the Union address, President Bush boldly proclaimed that "we seek the end of tyranny in our world. Some dismiss that goal as misguided idealism. In reality, the future security of America depends on it." Despite the president's endorsement of idealism, the United States' current foreign policy posture includes continuing realist attitudes.
Faustian bargains with the regimes of Egyptian President Mubarak and Prince Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, for example, are counterproductive to the United States' regional goals. Though the U.S. State Department cites Egypt's human rights record as "poor," Egypt receives the second-largest amount of American foreign aid. The State Department reports the lack of freedom of speech, press, assembly and association in Saudi Arabia; at the same time, Prince Abdullah meets with President Bush at his Crawford, Tex. ranch. The chasm between the United States' rhetoric and actions must close in order for America to successfully project itself as a sincere envoy of democracy to a skeptical world.
Juxtaposed against the burning effigies and desecrated American flags found on the streets of Cairo, pro-democratic and American movements stir inside Iran. Approximately two-thirds of Iranians believe that Iran's national interests were advanced through the regime change in Iraq, according to a June 2005 Iran Institute for Democracy survey of average Iranians.
What is the difference between Cairo and Tehran? Although both regimes deny its citizens rights, the United States has a long-standing symbiotic relationship with Mubarak, and, by contrast, brands Iran as part of the "Axis of Evil." Iranians embrace the United States for its antipathy toward the same regime that represses them. Iran teaches the United States that by staying true to its convictions, hearts and minds can be won.
After Sept. 11, the United States found an unlikely ally in Uzbekistan, Afghanistan's northern neighbor. In May 2005, Uzbekistan's authoritarian government crushed the peaceful protest of economically discontented countrymen, killing approximately 500 Uzbeks. With a stake in the former Soviet republic, the United States chose to ignore the largest state-sponsored massacre since Tiananmen Square. In a fitting symbol of the true value of such duplicitous alliances, the Uzbek government recently requested that the United States withdraw its forces from Uzbekistan.
The Bush Administration boasts the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine and the Lebanese "Cedar Revolution" to illustrate the success of its foreign policy. But for every Ukraine and Lebanon, how many Uzbekistans transpire?
In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the realist orthodoxy that the enemy of America's enemy is America's friend led the United States to support the Afghan Mujahideen resistance, including Osama bin Laden, whose victorious members later constituted the Taliban regime. During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, the United States funneled arms to Saddam Hussein, who three years later invaded Kuwait, leading to Operation Desert Storm.
America's past foreign policy experiences illustrate that forging convenient relationships with unsavory regimes ultimately produce undesirable externalities. The United States must heed these lessons to ensure that the 21st century is yet another "American century."
