For an administration often painted by critics as unilateralist, the Bush team seems to have amassed a substantial group of friends in the past week. Tired of French and German illusieons of being spokesmen for all of Europe, the leaders of Britain, Italy, Poland, Spain and fourteen other European nations professed solidarity with the Bush position regarding Iraq and offered to contribute to enforcement of Security Council resolutions. Barring an unexpected fatal accident for Mr. Hussein or his acceptance of exile, it seems clear that a coalition of nations led by the United States will disarm and remove him by force. The only significant question is whether this coalition will operate under the U.N. banner or independently. Standing in the way is the French Security Council veto. Therein lies the weakness of the structure of the Security Council.
Formed in 1946, the Security Council reflected power balances -- at least with respect to the emerging Cold War -- fairly accurately at its inception. Action under U.N. auspices could proceed only if the five chosen powers gave their assent or acquiescence. This diplomatic perk was wedded reasonably closely to the power of the five states. Germany and Japan, the losers of the preceding war, were not afforded veto privileges. Since 1946, the American, French, British, Chinese and Russian people have continued to enjoy this ability to stop
U.N. action, but the underlying strength of their nations has changed dramatically.
Thus we find ourselves in the current predicament. The French government holds that a second resolution -- which it threatens to veto -- is necessary to authorize force to remove Saddam Hussein. As a legal matter this is incorrect, as Resolution 1441, which passed unanimously, allows for military action if Iraq is found in "material breach" of the resolution. But as a practical matter, it would be much easier for the United States to lead a coalition to disarm Mr. Hussein without France carping about the legitimacy of a campaign undertaken without further explicit U.N. approval.
Because the Bush administration elected to work through the United Nations, we now see our options constrained by the anachronistic structure of the Security Council. Why France, a country with only fifty-eight million people, is allowed to dictate and constrain U.S. actions while India, a democracy with fifteen times as many people, has little influence, is beyond me. Certainly France was important in the past. It had a substantial empire and produced material abundance and cultural treasures. But so did Spain and Portugal, and they don't enjoy the preferred status of veto-wielding members of the Security Council. The problem is that France is far weaker now, relative to other powers, than it was in the earlier days of the Council, so when France threatens to use its veto capriciously it has the potential to destroy the institution if stronger powers ignore its action.
The danger of a collapse of the Security Council system is not obvious, but it is certainly possible. Consider the following scenario: The United States decides to oust Saddam Hussein for his lack of compliance with U.N. resolutions. The French oppose this action for fear of losing valuable contracts with the current Iraqi government, so they veto a second resolution authorizing force. The United States, along with a score of other nations, invades Iraq to install a new government and purge the nation of weapons of mass destruction. In this scenario the United States would win increased security, the Iraqi people would gain a more beneficent government, and the Arab world would gain its first true democracy. But the United Nations would be rendered inconsequential for its refusal to enforce its own resolutions. The League of Nations befell a similar fate, yet it is entirely possible that the same mistakes will occur in the United Nations if the structure of the Security Council is not modified soon.
While the structure of the United Nations is troublesome and a relic of history, the underlying concept of major powers meeting to promote peace and constrain war is a noble and worthwhile one. There will always need to be a forum for nations to discuss issues of concern and build treaties, alliances and friendships; the United Nations serves this purpose admirably. It works best when the great powers respect its wisdom and modify their actions as a result.
In the interests of intellectual consistency, I must admit that Britain has about as much a right to a Security Council veto as does France -- which is to say very little. Both are former colonial powers that once were great but now exert influence over only a small fraction of their former area. Great Britain has been far more receptive to the reasonable diplomatic overtures of Colin Powell than France, but that doesn't make their claim to a Security Council veto any more valid. Perhaps because their record in major wars over the past century boasts at least three more victories than the French, the British have accepted their new position in the world gracefully, with seriousness and intellectual consistency that has not been evident in the foreign policy of their cross-Channel rivals.
So, how should the Security Council be reformed so that minor powers do not hamstring the great ones and cause the system to implode? The current system represents power ratios as they were, not as they are and certainly how they will be. France and Britain should forfeit their seats, while India and perhaps Japan should gain veto power. It seems bizarre to me to have the world's most populous democracy, and second most powerful economy, respectively, excluded from a council of Great Powers. There would need to be a European seat, of course, because collectively they form a considerable power even if no single member wields substantial influence. If Europe, rather than France, held a Security Council veto and its decision-making was nominally democratic, the vote to enforce U.N. resolutions would be approximately 18-3, with only obstructionist France and pacifist Germany offering major resistance. A reformed Security Council could become our new best friend, offering legitimacy and material support for U.S. actions. It's time to reform the United Nations now, before inaction in the face of Iraqi intransigence demonstrates its fecklessness and relegates the United Nations to the dustbin of history.
