Picture this: A government accuses a woman of committing two crimes. It does not really matter what kind of crimes, just that they are serious enough for the government to be involved. The woman is brought before a federal court and after a lengthy trial the jury finds her guilty of one charge but acquits her of the other. Your basic could-have-been-better, could-have-been-worse scenario. Sort of like getting a B- on an exam when you hoped to do better but really did not study all that much. Except, of course, that your professor normally will not send you to jail.
So, the woman is brought before the judge to receive a sentence for the first crime. Her lawyer tells her that the maximum prison term for her crime is two years. Obviously she's not that thrilled about the prospect of going to jail in the first place, but hey, she did commit a serious crime. To her dismay, however, the court decides that in addition to the two-year maximum sentence she must serve another full year in jail for the second crime -- the one she was found not guilty of. Why? Because the judge said so.
A little scary, huh? Doesn't seem like a place that understands the concept of personal liberties too well. Could you imagine? Serving a sentence for a crime that you were acquitted of! It's a good thing that we don't have to worry about something like that happening in our justice system. At least not today. I mean, there certainly have been terrible instances of injustice in our nation's past. But something this bad? Not today. Not in the last thirty years, not since the civil rights legislation and equal protection laws. Besides, we have that double jeopardy clause to protect us from situations like this. Right?
Wrong. This was exactly the kind of scenario that the Supreme Court approved of this week in its rulings of two similar cases, United States v. Vernon Watts and United States v. Cheryl Putra. In a per curiam opinion issued on Monday, the Court held that it is both constitutional and in line with Federal sentencing guidelines for a judge to increase a sentence based on conduct for which a defendant was found not guilty. That's right, NOT guilty. As in innocent.
According to the Court, Federal judges may use acquitted charges to increase the sentence of a defendant, as long as the judge believed that the Government had proved the conduct underlying the charges by a "preponderance of the evidence," meaning that something is more likely true than not. This is the legal system's lowest standard of proof and is certainly much weaker than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used to determine guilt in criminal trials. In other words, a judge can bypass that whole "reasonable doubt" thing and sentence a person for a crime based on a simple hunch, even if a jury had already issued a verdict of acquittal. Of course, the person has to first be convicted of at least one of several charges for this to occur. That's comforting.
Enter the "imaginary" woman, Cheryl Putra. Putra was charged with two counts of aiding in the sale of cocaine. A jury found her guilty of the first charge, but acquitted her of the second. At the sentencing, however, the District Court decided that there was enough proof that Putra could have been involved in the second sale and therefore added a year to her sentence, bringing it to 33 months. Had she been convicted of both sales during the trial, she would have served the same 33 months. So much for the term "not guilty."
What was the Supreme Court thinking, one might ask? Good question. The Court's argument is based on a section of The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that calls for judges to consider a broad range of information about a convicted person's background when imposing a sentence. In the cases of Watts and Putra, the Court stretches this principle to include acquitted charges as well, stating that courts must consider "all related conduct, whether or not it results in a conviction." This seems to be quite a big stretch. By allowing courts to consider background information, did Congress really intend for judges to sentence defendants for crimes for which they had been acquitted?
Justice John Paul Stevens, one of two lone dissenters in the case, called the decision "perverse" and "repugnant" (excuse the vulgarity of the Supreme Court curse words, please). I agree.
The most disturbing part of the Court's ruling in United States v. Watts and United States v. Putra is the cavalier way in which it disposes of the "beyond a reasonable doubt" principle. This tough standard for criminal cases is supposed to be one of the shining lights of our legal system, providing a fair trial system by preventing fewer individuals from being wrongfully convicted of an offense. But now the Court says, "a preponderance of evidence" is enough when dealing with multiple crimes. I guess they decided that the more charges you are brought up on, the easier it should be to convict you. Does anyone else see the frightening implications here?
In the coming days there will be much talk about assisted suicide, a subject that has intrigued our nation and an issue which will engage the Supreme Court in a fascinating debate over life and death during the early months of this year. The question over the "right to die" is so complicated that several Justices implied this week that it may not even be their place to make a ruling on the matter. This may be so. It is their place, however, to uphold a fair system of justice for all American citizens. Perhaps they forgot this simple duty amidst all the hoopla over a more interesting case.
