Last week, I tuned into a John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding talk on Iran by Michael Rubin, a historian of Iran and senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Much of Rubin’s talk was enlightening: He provided an accurate assessment of several often-overlooked historical factors that are crucial in understanding Iran’s current situation, including the memory of the Iran-Iraq War, the entrenched structure of the Revolutionary Guard and even the legacy of the bygone Constitutional Revolution of 1905. His affinity for the Iranian people and their history, which no doubt stems from his extended time spent in the country, was apparent and admirable.
As his talk went on, however, it became clear to me that beyond providing uncontroversial context, Rubin’s own prescriptions for Iran’s modern problems are not in the country’s best interests: Rather, they are rooted in a narrow, uniquely American perspective that is itself partly responsible for those very problems Iran faces today.
Rubin eventually began to discuss the potential for regime change in Iran, referencing the nuances of the potential toppling of the Islamic Republic. Much of this nuance was left behind, however, when he arrived at the best case scenario, in which “everything goes smooth” and the eldest son of the former Shah Reza Pahlavi is able to return to Iran as its new leader. He then jumped right ahead to the complexities of supporting Pahlavi’s would-be new government, leaving no room to even question the idea that Pahlavi is Iran’s rightful ruler. Yet one would assume that, in discussing regime change in Iran, the most important question of all would be what kind of new regime should be built. So why was he taking Pahlavi as a given?
His answer is rooted in a particular Cold War narrative of Iran made to serve American geopolitical interests. As he said in his talk, the 1953 coup — in which the CIA and MI6 orchestrated the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and in turn empowered the incumbent Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi — was not a coup at all, but a “countercoup.” Although he didn’t expand on this view in his talk, he has written on it extensively, explaining that Mossadegh, who was widely popular at the time, was actually staging a coup by refusing to step down when the Shah, who had the power to appoint prime ministers, demanded him to.
But why was the United States obligated to stand by the Shah’s authority to suppress legitimate popular dissent? Is Rubin saying that any authoritarian regime can be justified by its own rules? By this line of reasoning, we could say that Nicolás Maduro was Venezuela’s rightful leader simply because he had the power to rig elections despite his opposition’s clear popularity.
Rubin goes further still, characterizing Mossadegh as “Soviet-leaning,” which is an age-old myth originally used to justify the coup. Historical scholarship has long shown instead that Mossadegh was a liberal democrat who refused to bow to any empire, be it Soviet or American, and simply wanted to free Iran of extractive oil contracts it held with the U.K. And, as declassified CIA documents show, Mossadegh’s backbone is the reason he was overthrown. One would expect an academic of Rubin’s stature to be above associating with red scare arguments, yet here we are, in 2026.
In the years after the coup, the empowered Shah developed a close albeit complicated relationship with neoconservatives in Washington, and American arms manufacturers benefited from his militarism to the tune of several billion dollars. But while the Shah’s regime benefited the U.S. strategically, its suppression of domestic dissent eventually motivated the disastrous 1979 revolution that created the modern Islamic Republic.
Rubin’s preference for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty is thus a continuation of a long history of neoconservative desire for the vassalization of Iran. His justification of the 1953 coup suggests a lot about what he wants out of a new Iran: a modern, suppressive government that the U.S. can once again use for its strategic benefit. His prescription for Iran’s future is doubly problematic — not just because it clearly bypasses the interests of the Iranian people, but because it could backfire for the United States too. Installing another Shah, even if he is more liberal than his father, could again lead to domestic turmoil and instability, threatening the new Iran’s reliability as an American ally. Establishing an independent liberal democracy from the start would do much more to ensure a lasting alliance between the two countries.
Within the Dartmouth bubble, I’m disappointed in the Dickey Center for International Understanding for platforming such a blatantly Americentric perspective on Iran’s future without at least giving the opportunity for an Iranian perspective to respond. It doesn’t seem like we’re really “understanding” Iran if we’re just looking at it through an American neoconservative lens.
Beyond Dartmouth, meanwhile, the real-world implications of this debate have become immensely pertinent. In the span of a few days, the Islamic Republic’s infrastructure has been turned to rubble, and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been killed. For many Iranians, this is a moment of celebration and opportunity, but much remains uncertain, including how involved the U.S. will be in regime change, how vulnerable the Islamic Republic will be to collapse, as well as if and how any kind of uprising can take place as the country continues to be bombed.
In the fleeting vacuum, many Iranian-Americans are turning to Reza Pahlavi as the country’s next leader. For some, he would just be a transitional leader, being the most convenient figurehead, and Pahlavi himself has expressed his desire for such a role. But if there really will be an opportunity for change at the end of this chaos, I urge my fellow Iranians and Iranian Americans to strive for more. There is no guarantee that a new Shah would only be temporary, and as tempting as it is to take the easy route and rally around Pahlavi, the only way to truly ensure lasting prosperity is for Iranians to build their own democracy from the ground up.
Too many times in Iran’s history have opportunities for freedom been hijacked by those who want control of the country. Too many times have people like Rubin been able to define Iran for Iranians before they could themselves. This time, we shouldn’t take any chances.
Opinion articles represent the views of their author(s), which are not necessarily those of The Dartmouth.
