Imran Sharih '04 should be lauded for his thoughtful and astute analysis of the obstacles posed by Israel's decision to erect a West Bank security fence (The Dartmouth, March 2). However, in passionately articulating his contentions, Sharih frequently overlooks and -- in some instances -- entirely fails to account for the complicating interplay of law, politics and history that surround the wall's construction.
From the outset, Sharih's assertion that the "security barrier is about people" and "political reality" falls flat. This simply isn't true. The wall is about security -- nothing more and nothing less.
While the notion that the state of affairs between Israelis and Palestinians has degenerated to a point where an unpleasant and highly undesirable physical barrier becomes necessity is tragic, it should not come as a surprise to Sharih, or any other regional observer.
Indeed, Sharih should not be quick to characterize the idea of forced separation as "dubious ... ludicrous ... and counter-productive." If three years of incessant violence and generations of war have taught Israelis anything, it's that disengagement often works.
It's no surprise that the Israeli government has used the success of the Gaza Strip barrier (which has effectively kept all Gaza Strip suicide bombers from killing Israeli innocents in Israel proper) as a model for the West Bank fence presently being constructed. Moreover, while Sharih raises several highly legitimate concerns about the "widespread and deep" consequence it will impose on the daily lives of Palestinians, he should not exaggerate the barrier's impact. The 210,000 Palestinians caught between the wall and Israel will neither teeter on the brink of starvation, nor be subjected to infinite security checkpoints as they go about their daily lives. Hyperbole is very unhelpful in this respect.
In fact, less than one week ago the Israeli government announced the alteration of the fence's route, shortening it from the initially proposed length of 770 km to 670 km, in order to address and assuage the very concerns raised by Sharih. Finally, and most importantly, several valid questions regarding the fence's route need to be addressed. Sharih wonders "why [the fence] snakes deep into Palestinian territory to encompass illegal Israeli settlements?" "Why was it not built along the internationally recognized pre-1967 border?" This fence remains, despite conspiratorial arguments to the contrary, a temporary security solution to an immediate security threat.
Like it or not, those "illegal Israeli settlements" are home to legally-recognized Israeli citizens whose vulnerability has been exploited by opponents of peace. While their presence on this land may be incomprehensible to many of Israel's critics, it does not make them fair game for Palestinian terrorists.
The final status of these settlers will only be determined as a result of a negotiated settlement between the two parties. Until then, the state of Israel is just as obligated to their safety as it is to the well-being of Israeli citizens living in Tel Aviv. And, while many question Israel's refusal to build along "the internationally recognized" 1967 lines, they would be well-served to remember that 90 percent of the fence's route interlocks consistently with this border (thus leaving Palestinians in control over 85 percent of the West Bank), and that the remaining land is still politically disputed by both Israelis and Palestinians.
Additionally, an Israeli decision to build precisely along 1967 lines would be tantamount to a direct capitulation to terror, since the attempted compulsion of Israel to this parameter has been one of the most clearly articulated objectives of the Palestinian intifada.
Yes, the fence is nasty, brutish and detestable -- but it may also be a requisite step toward creating the very cessation of violence needed to push the diplomatic process forward. Nothing in this conflict can be viewed in the absolute terms of right and wrong, so while this fence may be absolutely wrong, it remains absolutely right. Unfortunately, very desperate times call for very desperate measures.
