As the military campaign against Iraq rolls to its inevitable outcome, it is worth pausing to consider the larger ramifications of an allied victory on our relationship with Saudi Arabia. Our friends, the Saudis, enjoy a privileged position in our foreign policy due to their proximity to Iraq and their large deposits of oil. Following the defeat of Saddam Hussein's regime and the development of a democratic Iraqi government, these two Saudi assets will be of lesser strategic value, allowing the United States to assess more accurately the Saudi contribution to American security.
Anti-war protesters are correct when they note that the majority (15 of 19) of the Sept. 11 hijackers were Saudi, while none were Iraqi. Given that the tragedy of that day seems to have provided the impetus for a more interventionist Bush administration foreign policy, it is worth considering the implications of that statistic. Anti-war activists use it to argue that Iraq is a lesser threat than Saudi Arabia and that the current war is therefore unnecessary. Most do not advocate conflict with the Saudis, but rather use the fact to illustrate perceived hypocrisy in the Bush administration.
What they fail to consider is that one of the effects of a Coalition victory in Iraq would be a reduced incentive for the United States to appease the Saudi government's proclivity for supporting radical strains of Wahhabi Islam and the terrorism that sometimes accompanies it.
One of the recruiting techniques of Al Qaeda was to focus on the presence of American troops on Saudi soil, near Mecca, as a source of outrage. Those troops were stationed there following the first Gulf War to prevent Saddam Hussein from invading his neighbors again. The soldiers and their associated aircraft also formed the linchpin of world efforts to contain Saddam Hussein through the cover of the southern no-fly zone in order to prevent his government from murdering Shiites in the south.
Reasonable people can disagree about whether containment was the best policy, but all must recognize it was not without cost. The anger of Saudi youth toward the United States, manifested so vividly on Sept. 11, threatens our nation. The war with the current Iraqi regime will obviate the need for troops in Saudi Arabia, and hence allows us to re-deploy our troops away from Saudi soil. It will therefore mitigate the fury of ordinary Saudis, which has caused so much destruction and which holds the potential to cause further calamity.
It is likely that the positive tenor of our diplomatic relations with the Saudis will fade following a coalition victory in Iraq. This is not necessarily a bad thing. America is allied with Saudi Arabia not because we share their values of preventing women from traveling freely or of chopping off appendages of petty thieves, but rather because they are the lesser evil when compared with Saddam Hussein. That the Saudis have significant oil reserves also improves their negotiating position. But in the current relationship we are blinded to their many faults because of Mr. Hussein, so we acquiesce when they export terrorism. This is soon to change. Just as America allied itself with Joseph Stalin in World War II to defeat Nazi Germany, so too are we willing to undertake alliance with the Saudis in the current war. But they should understand that once the greater threat is eliminated, their position as a partner will erode rapidly. Although Stalin killed millions of his own people before World War II, the United States was right to seek alliance with him because as bad as he was, Hitler was worse. Once the conflict ended, the wartime alliance quickly devolved into the adversarial competition of the Cold War as each side re-evaluated its compatibility with the other.
Success in Iraq will allow us to do the same with Saudi Arabia. Wouldn't that mean creating a hostile relationship where a positive one currently exists? Yes, at the governmental level it would, but it would be a far more honest, and in the long-term, successful approach for reducing threats to America. It would allow ordinary Saudis to see that the cause of their sclerotic economy and lack of opportunity lies not with the United States, but with a government based on heredity that has not adapted to the modern world. The removal of American influence and support for the country's government would also allow the Saudis to assume the burden of their own defense, which might reduce the impotence they currently feel as a vassal state of a larger power.
Oil, the trump card the Saudis hold, is one that they cannot use due to their abominable economic planning. The Saudi government continues to exist only because of the large welfare payments it makes to its citizens. Demographics and declining oil prices over the last 30 years have rendered the threat of refusing to export oil a futile one. The Saudis could refuse to export oil to the United States, but because oil is a global commodity, the effects of such a decision would be largely superficial. Because it has proved so remarkably unsuccessful in extracting wealth from the minds of its people, the lifeblood of the Saudi government is the extraction of oil. The power of Saudi Arabia to punish America has been overstated.
True friendship, among nations as among people, stems from shared values. We have willingly blinded ourselves for too long to the values of Saudi Arabia that are so antithetical to our own. Success in Iraq, particularly if it is followed by a democratic inclusive government, will allow us to end the soft bigotry of low expectations we have had for countries like Saudi Arabia. This corrupt bargain has endured for too long. If the war designed to free the Iraqi people also allows us to reduce our complicity with the Saudi regime then we will have been doubly blessed.
