A few weeks ago, a number of international leaders condemned the U.S. for lobbying against Boutros Boutros-Ghali's campaign to win a second term as the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Their argument was that U.S. policymakers had reduced their foreign policy to an instrument of their country's domestic demands that have increasingly favored isolationism. Although there is truth to this claim, America's recent choice to antagonize the U.N. was inevitable and in some sense even wise.
The criticism of the American stance is partially legitimate because Boutros-Ghali has in fact been a consistent reformer, contrary to what Americans claim. He has contributed to the curtailment of the secretariat's staff from 12,000 in 1985 to 9,000 today, and the number of the U.N.'s departments has fallen by a third, much of the reductions implemented during his tenure. And for the U.S. to denounce Boutros-Ghali's leadership, while withholding its $1.5 billion payment to the U.N. in constant need of financial backing for its reform, is certainly absurd.
However, the world must also accept the fact that the U.N. has had only a mixed record at realizing its main objectives -- war-prevention and peace-keeping -- and that it will never become proficient in fulfilling them. The U.S.'s rebellion against the U.N. reflected the institution's such shortcomings.
The U.N.'s war-preventive efforts have been undoubtedly dismal, as the tragedies of Bosnia, Rwanda and Uganda exhibit. Its peace-keeping capability is also of a questionable quality because Boutros-Ghali has not adequately transformed his bureaucracy, bloated with overlapping and outdated agencies. For example, what justifies the preservation of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, whose only utility is its reports on commodities -- a task so small that another agency can easily absorb it? This inefficient allocation of funds has deteriorated the U.N.'s ability to monitor peace, as shown by the increasingly bleak outlook of long-term stability in Cambodia.
One could intelligently hope for a better U.N., if it is only the execution, but not the principle, of the institution that has been misguided. Unfortunately, the U.N. is flawed in both aspects, rendering any effective restructuring impossible. One obvious reason for this hopeless state is that the Security Council reflects the balance of power established at the end of the second World War. As a result the U.N. bestows limited authority to Japan, in spite of its second largest defense budget in the world, and Germany, in spite of its manifest status as the leader of Europe -- two countries whose roles in the maintenance of world peace are vital. Instead, a torn country like Russia, which cannot even keep peace at home, is treated as an equal of the U.S.
Even if the U.N. adopts a new Security Council based on the contemporary balance of power, the extent to which the new Council would benefit the world remains elusive. As has been frequently the case, strong powers tend to possess disparate national interests, preventing needed cooperation; China and Russia voted against the critical sanction bills for North Korea and Bosnia, respectively. Only on rare critical occasions, such as on Iraq, have the powers endorsed a common U.N. policy.
At the foundation of all of these grave problems lies the outdated doctrine of realism, which dominates the philosophies of current policymakers. Based on the premise that states maximize their national interests, this doctrine treats states as naturally conflictive units that avoid war only by balancing one another's military power -- the main principle underlying all U.N. decisions. It is a systematic but simplistic model of the world that fails to account for much of the complex reality. Realism applies to the relationship between India and Pakistan, perhaps, but not to that between Korea and Japan. The doctrine fails to explain many phenomena in the international system, such as the creation of the European Monetary Union that endangers state sovereignty, and thus goes against the European states' national interests. Nonetheless, as a legacy of the Cold War, during which such realists as Kissinger flourished as brilliant diplomats, this doctrine shapes countries' foreign policies even today, and explains our irrational attachment to the U.N.
Deprived of any practical functions, the U.N. can only continue to maintain its rather symbolic role as a forum where its members can gather to discuss as openly as possible their countries' foreign policies. As long as the world fails to defeat the academic paradigm of realism, which bares little resemblance to reality, the U.N. cannot sustain itself. It is up to the international relations theorists to undertake the necessary change in their discipline. Otherwise, the world will lose the U.N. and be left with nothing.
