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The Dartmouth
April 24, 2024 | Latest Issue
The Dartmouth

Chamseddine: Unintended Consequences

From crucifixions to public beheadings, the list of the Islamic State’s brutality is endless. When the U.S. announced its air campaign against the rebel group in both Iraq and Syria last summer, it seemed to be the right decision. A closer look at the implications of this campaign in Syria, however, shows that the decision to intervene is misguided. The U.S. has no strategic interests in defeating the Islamic State in Syria and the campaign is unlikely to be effective.

The American intervention against the Islamic State in Syria is not in self-defense. Despite the known beheadings of three Americans thus far, security experts agree that the Islamic State does not pose an immediate threat to the U.S., according to a Sep. 10 article in The New York Times. While the U.S. should be interested in protecting its allies in the region — from Israel to Egypt and Saudi Arabia — they are not under direct threat from the Islamic State either.

Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that these states would not be able to combat the Islamic State should the need arise. Helping the Iraqi government — an ally who hasn’t been able to defend itself — makes sense, in cases such as the American airstrikes in northern Iraq. Syria, however, is not currently an ally of the U.S. By extending the privilege of defense to Syria, the U.S. is not fulfilling any immediate security interests.

Admittedly, the U.S. could be motivated by humanitarian concerns — this has been true of American interventions in the past. Because Bashar al-Assad’s Ba’athist regime has lost legitimacy by killing thousands of its own people, the U.S. has just cause to stop the Islamic State’s aggression against Syrian civilians. This air campaign, however, is unlikely to do the job because targeting the Islamic State empowers the Syrian government and its allies. Assad is not the lesser of two evils — the regime’s record in human rights violations and abuses is long, horrific and arguably worse than that of the Islamic State. By choosing to strike the latter and not the Syrian regime, the U.S. is essentially helping the Syrian Army combat the enemies of the regime. The U.S. is, by default, taking the side of the Syrian government and other actors interested in preserving the Ba’ath party — like Hezbollah and Iran.

Moreover, conducting airstrikes carries significant risks in regard to the civilian population. President Obama publicly promised to not send in ground combat troops to fight the Islamic State in a nationally televised address on Sep. 10. Without boots on the ground, there is little intelligence gathering, which exacerbates the problem of identifying terrorist networks and infrastructure. Without accurate intelligence, airstrikes can be imprecise — especially because the U.S. has relaxed its policies on avoiding collateral damage in Syria. Additionally, American airstrikes allow the Assad regime to cover its own strikes on civilians. Another problem is the effective spread of military and humanitarian aid to civilians. Without ground troops, both weapons and humanitarian aid could end up in the wrong hands. In October, for example, The Guardian reported that the Islamic State seized a U.S. airdrop meant for Kurdish fighters.

Unless the Obama administration changes its policy, there is little hope that the operation against the Islamic State will be effective. Collateral damage due to U.S. airstrikes could even move the civilian population to support the Islamic State. These unintended consequences could make the campaign counter­productive.

Finally, even if troops were deployed to Syria, they would not settle the complex sectarian conflict. Military intervention against one side disrupts the process that ultimately leads to the victory of one over the other. While U.S. intervention would terminate the war sooner, it would leave the power balance between the warring parties unresolved. The likeliness of recurring conflict would remain high, given the absence of a political solution between the two parties. Letting the war in Syria run its course is bad for the short term, but necessary for stabilizing the country in the future.

Despite its admirable intent, the U.S. campaign is not strategic, but risky and possibly destabilizing. For now, the U.S. should stop its airstrikes in Syria. Eventually, it will have an important role to play in relief aid and the reconstruction of post-­war Syria.